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I IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 1\ 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
vs. \ Case No. 
BETTY LeSOURD, a woman, ALEX / 11866 
T. DA VIES and THELMA DA VIES, )\ 
his wife, and VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This Appeal makes the second time the subject case 
has been brought before the Court for review. Both ap-
peals have been by the Government, 1 the initial one hav-
ing inYolved a singular issue of law, and the instant one 
lThe initial appeal by the Road Commission was taken from the Judgment 
nf District Judge Swan of March 26, 1969, and the case reported under Opinion 
No. 11866 of this Court on July 23, 1970. The case was remanded to the trial 
Court for further proceedings in accordance with this Court's mandate. 
1 
being the review of a factual determination made by the 
trial Judge. The action has been pending since the filing 
of the Condemnation Complaint in September, 1967. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a case in condemnation regarding the ex-
propriation by the State Road Commission of certain 
property of the Defendant-Landowners situated in Sum-
mit County. The property, commonly known as the Kim-
ball Junction Cafe and Service Station, was located at 
1 
the intersection of U. S. 40 and the Snyderville-Park 
City highways (Kimball Junction). (Tr. 300, 572, 575, 
586). 
The jurisdictional issues relative to the right of the 
Road Commission to condemn the Defendants' proper-
ties were not contested and the matter proceeded to trail 
on the constitutional and statutory questions of Just 
Compensation. The latter questions were submitted for 
non-jury trial before District Judge Thornley K. Swan, 
and after approximately a week of value testimony from 
four expert witnesses in late 1968 and early 1969, Find-
ings and Conclusions were made and Judgment entered. 
( R. 48-55) . Upon appeal by the Road Commission, the 
case was remanded and additional proceedings ordered 
by this Court. 2 Further hearings and trial were held dur-
ing the latter part of 1970, after which a Memorandum 
Decision was issued by the trial Court in January, 1971 
224 U.2d 383, 472 P.2d 939 ( 1970). 
2 
and Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment of Just Compensation were made and entered 
in March of this year pursuant to Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. 
(R. 71-78). 
The State takes this Appeal on claimed error of 
fact made by Judge Swan on remand. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT 
AFTER REMAND 
The Brief of Appellant's counsel herein hardly 
presents to this Court an accurate portrayal of the events 
of trial in the lower Court subsequent to remittitur in the 
first appeal. 3 Indeed, one would believe from a reading 
of the Brief that the District Court, upon remand of the 
case, listened to some perfunctory argument of lawyers 
and then in casual style, delivered a second Memoran-
dum Decision and conformed Amended Findings, Con-
clusions and Judgment. Such was most certainly not the 
case. To the contrary, the trial Court, as set out in the 
Statement of Facts below, published its Memorandum 
Decision of January 25, 1971, only after extended Mo-
tions, Pre-trial Order, and hearings, all in compliance 
with this Court's mandate in the first appeal. 
lThe Road Commission's Brief is devoid of any discussion or even refer-
ence to the specific proceedings which transpired before the District Court upon 
remand. While those proceedings were both substantial and material, the closest 
Appellant's counsel gets to them is a nondescript comment on page 3 of his 
Brief that the trial Judge; 
after argument of counsel and deliberation, entered a Memorandum 
Decision * * *. 
Such slight of hand definition of the post-appeal happenings in this case scarcely 
does justice to the ~fforts of the trial Judge and the parties to meet the mandate 
of this Court in Opinion # 11866. 
3 
Upon such proceedings having occurred, Judge 
Swan resolved the primary factual determinate incident 
to remand, viz., that in the initial Findings and J udg- • 
ment, severance damage of $5,800.00 had been attributed , 
to the "nonowned" land as defined by the opinion of this 1 
Court and that such severance damage could be elimi-
nated from the condemnation award by mathematical 
deduction. In consequence, Judge Swan issued Amended 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law in accordance with 
Rule 52, and thereupon entered the Amended Judgment I, 
of Just Compensation on March IO, 1971. (R. 76-78). 
In so doing, the trial Court reduced the condemnation \ 
award by $5,800.00 (as well as interest thereon at 8% I 
for three years and six months) from the original J udg- / 
ment of $65,992.00 to the Amended Judgment of f 
$60,192.00. ( 
The Road Commission counsel has filed this second '\ 
appeal alleging insufficiency of evidence, in fact, to 
"justify" the Amended Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment. (App. Brief pp. 3-4). 
I 
{ 
I 
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY ROAD COl\1MISSION I, 
ON APPEAL l 
In this Appeal, it is contended that this Court 
should now reverse the Findings made and Amended 
Judgment entered by Judge Swan on remand, and that 
a new trial is required and be ordered. 
4 
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Alternatively, Road Commission counsel argues 
that this Court should factually determine that the value 
testimony of the Government's sole appraisal witness, 
Austin, was the only competent evidence received in the 
entire trial and that this Court, therefore, order judg-
ment in favor of the State in the amount of the Austin 
appraisal, $34,500.00. (App. Brief p. 4) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The failure of Commission counsel to address him-
self to or discuss the post-appeal proceedings conducted 
by the trial Court in response to this Court's mandate in 
the first appeal, requires that the Respondent-Land-
owners present separately their Statement of the facts 
pursuant to Rule 75(p) (2) U.R.C.P.4 Moreover, be-
cause of the context and form in which Road Commis-
sion's counsel has framed his Statement, no part of the 
same is adopted in the Landowners' statement. 
I. The Subject Property. 
In 1967, the year of condemnation, the Kimball 
Junction Cafe and Service Station was situated on the 
"swing" southwest corner of U. S. 40 and the Park City 
Highway, with full and direct access to both highway 
arteries. (Tr. 300, 572, 57 5). The property, 1.33 acres, 
4Qf the 9 pages of the Road Commission's Brief devoted to th_e Statement 
of Facts, approximately V2 of one page is taken with the events o~ tnal upon re-
n1and before Judge Sw«n. In predominant measure, the Appellants Sta.tement. of 
Facts simply defaults in comrng to gnps with the relevant issues with which 
this Appeal must concern itselt, as a matter of law. 
5 
was developed with restaurant, service station, and smal 
fishing-tourist type cabins. (Tr. 70, 278). It was undis. 
puted that the highest and best use of the property, at tht 
date of service of summons, was for the existing com 
mercial purposes. (Tr. 383, 502, 575, 621). The taking 
by the Road Commission knocked out the sanitary sys. 
tern and storage tanks of the property (Tr. 3ll, 118. 
406), the right-of-way line came within less than orn 
foot of the remaining service station pumps (Tr. 311), 
and the property was deprived of all access to U. S. 4~ 
and the Park City Highways (Tr. 514, 595, 596). Ji 
was the judgment of all value witnesses, including the 
State, that the highest and best use of the subject prop· 
erty, after condemnation, was no longer as a commercial 
service station-restaurant (Tr. 513, 662). 
2. The Initial Appeal. 
On original appeal, this Court was presented witn 
the issue of whether open and undisturbed possession 
under claim and color of title by the Landowners wm 
ii 
sufficient, as a matter of law, to support an award oi 
severance damage to remaining property. State Roan 
Commission v. Davies, et al., 24 U.2d 383, 472 P.2d 93~ 
( 1970). The Court determined that such a showing wai 
not legally adequate and that severance damages coulo 
not be awarded as to land ( nonowned) which the owner 
could not make a showing of full title, by record or ad· 
verse possession. The case was thus remanded back to 
the trial Court with directions to eliminate, if possible 
from the Findings and Judgment any factual considera 
6 
1al tion of severance damages to such "nonowned" property, 
:fa title to which had not completely ripened as of the date 
tht of condemnation. Under the Opinion, if and only if the 
>m trial Judge were unable to make the factual segregation 
mg of severance damage to the "nonowned" land and elimi-
ys· nate the same from the Judgment, was a new trial to be 
18. ordered. The mandate of the Court in this regard was 
Hlt specific: 
I), 
4~ 
Ji 
:he 
1p· 
ial 
"The judgment is reversed and the case re-
manded with directions to the trial judge to elim-
inate from his findings and judgment all sever-
ance damages a warded for the nonowned land if 
he now can do so-otherwise a new trial is order-
ed." Page 940 of 472 P.2d. 
No petition for rehearing with respect to the re-
versal or the mandate in the Court's Opinion, was filed 
by any party. (See Record and Docket Book) . 
3. Lower Court Proceedings Upon Remand. 
)JI 
Upon remittitur of the case, the following proceed-
fi) 
oi ings were had before District Judge Swan: 
1J (a) On October 26, 1970, the Landowners filed 
li 
ii 
0 
before the trial Court a "Motion for Elimination of 
Damage to Non Record Title and Determination of 
Just Compensation In Accordance with Supreme 
Court Mandate." (R. 94-100). The Motion evi-
denced, as undisputed, that all commercial build-
ings, facilities and appurtenances of the Kimball 
Junction Cafe and Service Station were situated on 
the 1.33 acres of property, the title to which was not 
7 
in contest. ( R. 95) . No commercial buildings, im· 
provements or facilities of the caf e or service station 
were located on "nonowned" property as defined by 
the Supreme Court Opinion. ( R. 95) . Under the 
mandate in Davies, the trial Court was to excise any 
severance damage to the "nonowned" land. It was 
submitted by the Motion that as a matter of fact, 
the trial Court in the first instance did not allocate 
severance damage to such "nonowned" land, or that 
if severance damage was so ascribed, it could not in 
fact exceed a sum certain, but that in all events, the 
trial Court should proceed to eliminate and strike 
any such severance damage to "nonowned" land and 
otherwise enter appropriate Amended Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment. ( R. 98) . 
The Road Commission filed no pleadings and 
did not contest in form the Landowners' Motion. 
(b) A prehearing conference was held before 
Judge Swan on October 28, at which time the issues 
raised by the Opinion and Mandate of the Supreme 
Court were explored and discussed in depth and a 
course of procedure adopted to resolve the ques·. 
tions. (Vol. IV Tr. 2). 
( c) Judge Swan, on November 10, entered an 
"Order Establishing Issues to be Presented ana 
Determined in Accordance with Supreme Cour!I 
Opinion." (R. 101-103). Under the Order, three/ 
factual issues were prescribed for determination b) 1 
the trial Judge : 
8 
O· 
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t, 
tt 
1e 
e 
d 
( 1) Did the trial Court, in the initial J udg-
ment, find severance damage to the "non-
owned" land? 
( 2) Did the trial Court, in the initial J udg-
ment, find some severance damage attrib-
utable to the "nonowned" land and if so , 
how much? 
( 3) Should the trial Court now find that it is 
factually impossible to separate, distin-
guish, and eliminate severance damage to 
the "nonowned" land and if so, should a 
new trial be ordered? ( R. 102-103) . 
The Order was approved by counsel for both 
parties. 
( d) Thereafter in November, a hearing went 
forward before the trial Court, at which both coun-
sel presented extended argument on the attendant 
factual issues as framed in the Prehearing Confer-
ence Order of November 10. (Vol. IV, Tr. 1-34). 
On the one hand, the Landowners contended 
that the Supreme Court had passed on an extremely 
narrow issue in the appeal (i.e., severance damage 
to "nonowned" land) . That such question was mere-
ly one aspect of the larger case and that this Court, 
by its Opinion, had not intended to require a new 
trial and new findings on all other elements of the 
suit (such as the fair market value of land, improve-
ments, and fixtures taken and damaged in the un-
9 
disputed area) , unle.ss the trial Judge factually de. 
termined that segregation and elimination of sever. 
ance damage to the "nonowned" land were not pos. 
sible. (Vol. IV, Tr. 2-20). Thus it was urged that 
the mandate of this Court directed the lower Court 
"to eliminate from his Findings and Judgment sev. 
erance damages awarded for the nonowned land rt 
he could do so" therefore making unnecessary a re· 
trial of issues that were uneffected and untoucheo 
by the Supreme Court Opinion. (Vol. IV, Tr. 2-7). 
Landowners' counsel then demonstrated to the trial 
Court the methodology which might be employed, 
in the Court's discretion, to strike the "nonowned" 
severance damage from the original Findings ano 
Judgment. (Vol. IV, Tr. 7-20, 27-33). 
State counsel, on the other hand, argued that it 
was a factual impossibility for the trial Court, m 
finder of fact, to isolate or eliminate severance dam· 
age to the "nonowned" land. (Vol. IV, Tr. 20-27). 
It was contended that State counsel had not cross· 
examined the valuation experts of the Landownen 
regarding the impact upon their total opinions of 
the "nonowned" land. 5 (Vol. IV, Tr. 26-27). The 
State in its argument offered no conceivable methoo 
or amount for the eliminiation of severance damage 
to the "nonowned" land. At no time did State coun· 
sel argue before Judge Swan that the value testi·, 
5 Jt was noted in rebuttal argument that if cross-examination of the Lani ! 
owners' witnesses had not been conducted at trial, the reason was because State' 
counsel had voluntarily elected not to pursue such. (Vol. IV, Tr. 28-29). 
10 
l· 
15. 
at 
rt 
many of the Landowners' witnesses, Kiepe, Palmer 
and Mooney was legally incompetent. 
The matter was thereupon submitted for con-
sideration. 
\'· ( e) On January 25, 1971, the trial Court is-
tl sued its .Memorandum Decision in which it stated: 
e-
~ 
). 
11 
l, 
I" 
"That this Court, in its original Findings and 
Judgment, did attribute some severance damage 
to that land which was referred to by the Su-
preme Court as "nonowned land" and such sev-
erance damage can be eliminated from the Find-
ings and Judgment; that the element of sever-
ance damage to the property, characterized as 
"nonowned land," played a small part in the 
Court's considerations of this matter in the initial 
trial. A review of the testimony of the expert ap-
praisal witnesses at trial, and especially the break-
down of the categories of land in such opinion 
evidence, the exhibits, and the Court's calcula-
tions based thereon, indicate that the elimination 
of severance damages to the "non-owned land" 
is supported under the record and can be accom-
plished by the elimination of the rear non-owned 
land and other rear property from the case, leav-
ing as the property under consideration the front-
age area of 1.33± acres agreed upon by counsel, 
the title to which is undisputed." ( R. 86). 
Judge Swan observed that the testimony of 
the State's witness, Austin, was of significance in 
arriving at the factual conclusion that severance 
damage to the "nonowned" land could be excised 
from the Findings: 
11 
"Of particular importance to the Court in elim 
inating severance damage to the "non-ownea 
land" is the evidence of the State's witness, Greg. 
ory Austin, who testified that he considered a1 
part of the basic commercial unit 1.33 acres oi 
land, and that as to the balance of the properti 
the same was worth $2,000.00 per acre before 
condemnation and was of the same value after 
condemnation (Tr. 693). In other words, under 
Mr. Austin's appraisal, there was no difference in 
the value of the "non-owned land" before ano 
after condemnation." ( R. 86). 
The trial Judge then factually indicated tha! 
$5,800.00 was the sum which had been previously 
allocated and awarded for severance damage to the 
"non-owned" land and: 
"That the Court can eliminate from its Find· 
ings such severance damage by a reduction in the 
Judgment of $5,800.00 * * *." (R. 86). 
The Memorandum Decision was concluded by 
a mathematical calculation of the fair market value 
of the property, title to which was not in dispute. 
Before and After condemnation, the difference in 
the two sums being $60,192.00. The Court declared: 
"* * * The latter sum is $5,800.00 less than the 
original Findings and Judgment of $65,992.00' 
as just compensation to be awarded the land· 
owners. The Court thus concludes that $5,800.00 
is the amount of severance damages to the "non· , 
owned land," that such should be eliminated fron11 
the Findings and Judgment, and that the J udg· i 
ment of this Court should be accordingly enteret.\! 
for just compensation in the sum of $60,192.00. ' 
(R. 87). 
12 
( f) Amended Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law were made (R. 71-75) and an Amend-
ed Judgment of Just Compensation thereupon en-
tered on March 10. (R. 76-78). From the Amended 
Judgment, the State prosecutes this second Appeal. 
4. Value Evidence Supportive of Amended Find-
ings. 
The testimony at trial upon which the lower Court, 
as trier of fact, could find the fair market value of the 
undisputed land vis-a-vis the "nonowned" land and thus 
eliminate severance damage therefrom, runs through the 
testimony of all the value experts. Since the case was a 
non-jury trial, the value testimony by both sides was sub-
mitted through the proffer of economic summation 
sheets on legal sized paper, for quick and convenient 
reference by the Court and counsel. (Ex. D24, D29, D31 
and P38). Such evaluation sheets were ciphered so as to 
specify, with particularity, each of the elements of value 
as part of the larger appraisal. The fair market value of 
the owned land, as contrasted to the "nonowned" land, 
market value of the improvements and fixtures measured 
as part of the realty, both in their condition Before and 
After condemnation, the fair market value of the land 
taken6 and the damage to the remainder land caused by 
the taking and construction of the public project were 
each and all broken out and defined separately as part of 
the witness's total opinion. (Ex. 24, 29, 31, 38). 
6Title to the property actually condemned by the Road Commission was 
nncr in Joubt and was acknowlcJged to be in these Landowners. (Tr. 18-19). 
13 
Incident to the fin dings of the trial Court, the fo]. 
lowing evidence was a part of the record: 
Marcellus Palmer (Ex. 24) ... Market valUt 
of the land upon which the commercial improve. 
ments were located was $12,500.00 per acre. (Tr. 
392, 393, 399) . Three comparable sales were sup-
portive of that evaluation. (Tr. 394-399). Improve-
ments and fixtures located on the undisputed land 
and appraised as part of the realty, were evaluated 
pursuant to the income and cost replacement ap-
proaches to value. (Tr. 402, Ex. 24) . The value o! 
the "nonowned" land was also determined and stated 
separately. (Ex. 24, Tr. 399). The market value al 
remaining undisturbed land and improvements were 
evaluated and denoted. (Ex. 24A, Tr. 399, 418· 
419). 
Werner Kiepe (Ex. 31) ... Land value of the 
owned commercial area was stated and specifically 
segregated from the back or "nonowned" land. (Ex. 
31 p. 3, Tr. 586, 601-602). Improvements and fix. 
tures, as part of the realty, were likewise a ppraisea ! 
and their value demonstrated separately on the sum·: 
mary chart Exhibit 31. The value of the properD·1 
remaining, title to which was uncontested, was in·; 
dependently catalogued from the "nonowned" land, I 
along with the remainder improvements and fix·' 
tures on property admittedly owned. (Ex. 31A, Tr. 
601-602) . Mr. Kiepe utilized sales of related prop· 
erties to establish the value ascribed to the undis· 
puted land. (Tr. 587-593). 
14 
Jerome H. Mooney (Ex. 29) ... Property 
within the undisputed area was appraised at 
$13,000.00 per acre, together with improvements 
and fixtures thereon under the cost and ca pitaliza-
tion methodology of evaluation. (Ex. 29, Tr. 506-
508) . The witness testified to four sales of prop-
erty deemed comparable to the property admittedly 
owned by the Defendants. (Tr. 508-512). The value 
of the remaining owned property After condemna-
tion was separately appraised as well as the rem-
nant improvements and fixtures being set out spe-
cially. (Tr. 513-516). 
All of the value experts for the Landowners testi-
fied with respect to a sale or sales of other remnant tracts 
as comparative to the remaining owned land, in arriving 
at severance damage opinion, as well as factors of depre-
ciation, diminution in value, and loss of economic utility 
of the remaining property and improvements. (Tr. 406-
H7, 516-517, 606-607). 
Testimony and evidence of the Landowners' experts 
on market value of the property Before and After con-
demnation, comparable sales, land value of the taking 
and severance damage were received by the trial Court 
without objection from the State as to the competency 
or relevancy thereof. 
Gregory Austin (Ex. 38) ... The single value 
witness called by the Road Commission, Mr. Austin 
testified that the "nonowned" land had no effect 
upon and made no difference in his appraisal of the 
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owned land, either Before or After condemnation. 
(Tr. 693). The witness found that the "nonowned" 
land had no bearing upon any determination of sev. 
erance damage (Tr. 686, 693) and that his total 
opinion of land value condemned and severance 
damages was without regard to "nonowned" prop. 
erty. (Ex. 38, Tr. 693, 719). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
AS FACT FINDER, THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS 
FULLY EMPOWERED TO EXERCICE AND 
ELIMINATE THE SEVERANCE DAMAGE 
TO THE NONO,VNED LAND FROM HIS CAL·' 
CULATION OF DAMAGE AND TO AMEND 
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGlVIENT ACCORD· 
INGLY. 
District Judge Swan sat as the trier of fact in this 
case. He heard the testimony, received and examined 
the exihibits, observed the demeanor of the witnesses, 
and listened to argument. It was the trial Court who 
weighed the testimony and exhibits for their probative 
value and determined, based upon the evidence and per· 
sonal notes, wherein the preponderance rested. It was 
that Court who reviewed the economic summation charts 
of each value expert wherein the categories of land, 
owned and "nonowned," improvements and fixtures, 
were segregated and categorized. And it was that Court, 
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who upon remand of this case on appeal, reviewed the 
" evidence, the summation sheets and his personal notes, 
and factually resolved that it was possible to ascertain 
the severance damage which the trial Judge, himself, 
e had previously allocated in the initial Findings and 
Judgment to the "nonowned" land and that it was pos-
sible to strike and eliminate that severance damage from 
his Amended Findings and Judgment. It is this factual 
determination as to which State counsel seeks review in 
this appeal. 
The rule of law applicable in the instant case is so 
well founded in decisional precedent that it stands above 
all but the most academic debate. Broad discretion is 
bestowed on the trial Court as a fact finder in a non-
jury trial. Sweeney v. Happy Valley Inc., 18 U.2d 113, 
417 P .2d 126 ( 1966). His is the prerogative to believe or 
disbelieve the testimony of one or more witnesses, to 
ferret the conflicts in the evidence, to draw inferences, 
to determine reliability, and to measure and calculate 
the factual elements of damage. Marks v. Continental 
Casualty Co., 19 U.2d 119, 427 P.2d 387 (1967); Dil-
worth v. Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 386, 424 P.2d 136 (1967). 
The discretionary scope of the trial Judge in passing 
upon questions of fact in a non-jury action has no less 
breadth than that of a venire in a trial by jury. Evans v. 
Stewart, 17 U.2d 308, 410 P.2d 999 (1966) .7 While the 
;The Court stated in the Evans decision that: 
"We have often stated that the jury has broad prerogative in 
determining issues of fact; and when it (the trial judge} has t~e 
role of trier of the facts, this 1s of course equally true of the tnal 
Court." 
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precedent from this Court, alone, is thus legion on the 
prerogatives and authority of the trial Judge on matters: 
of fact in a non-jury trial, the position of the Road Com-i 
mission in this appeal seems to be taken in patent dis-
1 
regard. Simply put, that position holds that Judge Swan 1 
erred in his "finding that severance damages to the non-' 
owned land could be eliminated" from the trial Court'i 
Findings and Judgment. See Appellant's Brief Point I, 
p. 13. It is said therein that there is no evidence in the 
1 
record in which the expert witnesses specifically deline-: 
ated and inventoried the land into categories of owned 
1 
and "nonowned" property, and that consequently, Judge! 
Swan could not, from all the testimony, arrive at a cal· 
culation as to the amount of severance damage whicn 
he, as fact finder, initially attributed to the "nonowned" 
property. I 
Such argument is preposterous and falls of its own 
weight. There is no ignominious rule that the trier of 
fact must view the evidence in a vacuum divorced from 
all common experience, that he must passively accept or 
reject the land value of particular acreage under a wit· 
ness's testimony, that he adhere to some slide rule for· 
mula of severance damages, or that he must somehow 
wed himself, as a mechanical robot, to the precise testi· 
mony of the witness. Indeed, the opposite proposition 
holds sway, that the fact finder is accorded wide latitude 
to draw from the evidence such factual derivatives as he 
deems the weight and preponderance suggests. As stated 
by this Court in Even Odds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 U.2d 
49, 448 P.2d 709 (1968): 
18 
:he 
Il·' 
""\Ve have no disagreement with the proposi-
tion that the fact-trier should not be permitted to 
arbitrarily ignor competent, credible and uncon-
tradicte<l ev1dence. Nevertheless, he is not bound 
to slavishly fallow the evidence and the figures 
given by any particular witness. Within the limits 
of reason it is his prerogative to place his own ap-
praisal upon the evidence which impresses him as 
credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in ac-
cordance with his own best judgment. * * *" I, 
l1e
1 e-' In Weber Basin Conservancy District v. Nelson, 11 
,d 1 U.2d 253, 358 P.2d 81 (1960), a condemnation case, it 
• I was contended that the trier of fact could not accept one ~e 
]. phase of the testimonial evidence as to land value Before 
:n condemnation and also adopt in the findings inconsistent 
r opinion evidence on the remainder value After condem-
1 nation. In rejecting such argument, this Court declared: 
"The jury was entitled to believe or disbelieve 
in part or in whole the testimony of the two ap-
praisers. Regardless of how arrived at, the jury 
chose the 'before' value of Plaintiff's appraiser 
and the 'after' of the Defendants' appraiser.*** 
This Court cannot go behind the answers and 
analyze or speculate as to the process by which 
the jury arrived at them." 
The facts in the case at hand come short of even 
J the rule in Nelson for there is nothing to prompt the 
suggestion herein of inconsistent opinion testimony or 
' findings. The point to be made, however, is that the trial 
Court is not required to cling to the formal, structured 
testimony in strait-jacket fashion. It may and it did de-
rive from the perimeter of the testimony the amount of 
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severance damage attributed to the "nonowned" lam 
and such severance damage was stricken from th1 
Amended Findings and Judgment. In so doing, th 
Judgment was reduced in the sum of $5,800.00 togethe 
with forty-two months of interest at 8%, to the benefi 
of the State Road Commission. 
I. The trial, Court Findings of Fact are presurmi 
correct. 
Judge Swan found, as fact, that some severanc1 
damage was allocated to the "nonowned" land in th1 
original Findings and Judgment, although such "playei : 
a small part in the Court's considerations," that the "elim' 
I 
ination of severance damages to the "nonowned" land ii , 
supported under the record and can be accomplished b1; 
the elimination of the rear nonowned land" and that sud! 
1 
severance damage of $5,800.00 "should be eliminateoj 
from the Findings and Judgment." ( Memor. Dec. R. 8~.1 
87). The Brief of Appellant fails to recognize that sud! 
Findings of the trial Court carry a presumption of cor·! 
rectness and validity in the judicial review and that thll 
I 
Court, on appeal, will canvass the evidence in a ligh'. 
favorable to the Findings. As stated by this Court ill 
Sullivan v. Turner, 22 U.2d 85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968) i1 
'11 
"When the trial judge has made findings 01 a 
fact and entered judgment thereon, they are en· 
titled to the presumption of correctness; on appd e 
the evidence is surveyed in the light favorable!t rr 
them; and if there is any reasonable basis in tlit I[ 
evidence to support them they will not be over·l 11 
turned." I 
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I 
I 
lnl The "reasonable basis" test in Sullivan as supportive 
th1 of the trial Court's Findings has not at all begun to be 
th examined by the State in this Appeal. 
he. 
efi 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT JUDGE FOLLOWED TO 
Ui 
THE LETTER THE :MANDATE OF THIS 
COURT ON THE FIRST APPEAL. 
lei The Statement of Facts herein discusses with some 
th'. amplification, the legal issues raised in the first appeal 
iei and the Opinion of this Court. The Decision carried a 
m mandate to the trial Court to remove from his Findings 
Ii; 
·and Judgment any severance damages awarded to the 
b1 nonowned land, if such were possible. The language of 
1d 
eol the mandate was not unclear: 
%1 "The judgment is reversed and the case re-
manded with directions to the trial judge to elim-~ l inate from his findings and judgment al sever-
ance damages awarded for the non-owned land if 
he now can do so-otherwise a new trial is or-
dered." 
ill On remand, and after a full fledge of motions, hear-
) ings and argument, the District Court, in compliance 
. with the mandate, excised $5,800.00 in severance dam-
01 
n· age, originally attributed to the nonowned land, and 
~ eliminated such from his Amended Findings and J udg-
ti ment. That the trial Judge was able to make such calcu-
11 lution and deduction is manifest from the language of 
the Memorandum Decision and from the Findings of 
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Fact. Only NOW State counsel is heard to complau 
with respect to Judge Swans' observance of this Court. 
mandate. The meaning of the mandate was perf ecth 
apparent when the Opinion was filed on July 23, 1970
1 
i.e., that the trial Court should excise from his Finding. 
any severance damage to the nonowned land and by s1 
doing, thus avoid a full trial de novo on every aspect oti 
value and damages in the case (none of which were be.: 
fore this Court or affected in the first appeal) .8 
State counsel was well advised of this Court's man 
date and charge to the trial Judge when the opinion in 
the first appeal was issued. If he is dissatisfied with thai 
mandate now, he was dissatisfied with the mandate then' 
and accordingly, the appropriate remedy was to havti 
brought before this Court, on a Petition for Rehearing.I 
his alleged grievance. In a word, the complaint of Ap·I 
pellant' s counsel is directed not to the Amended Fina· 
ings and Judgment of Judge Swan, but rather to thi., 
Court's mandate. An attempt to resurrect at this belated 
time such claimed error is ill-fated in this Appeal. Dat•i, 
v. Payne ~ Day, Inc., 12 U.2d 107, 363 P.2d 49! 
( 1961); Prudential Federal Savings ~ Loan Assoc. r 
St. Paul Insurance Co., 22 U.2d 70, 448 P.2d 721 
(1968). 
Judge Swan's Amended Findings, Conclusions ana 
Judgment should be affirmed. Johnson v. Kayle, 7 U.2° 
27,317P.2d596 (1957). 
8The laudable judicial policy not to require needless litigation with respo< 
to issues already and finally resolved has had long tenure at this Court. Pe/fl', 
Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d 589 ( 1948); Gaddis Inv. Co. v. MorrtJon. 
U.2d 152, 289 P.2d 730 (1955). 
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POINT III. 
THE APPEAL OF THE ROAD COMMISSION 
HEREIN FAILS TO PRESENT ANY QUES-
TION OF LA 1i\T SUBJECT TO REVIEW BY 
THIS COURT. 
This Court, through the whole span of its decision 
making process, has been mindful of its constitutional 
role in appellate review. That rule has been stated with 
clarity and firmness in a host of cases from Nelson v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 15 Utah 325 49 Pac. 644 (1897), 
through Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240, 51 Pac. 
980 ( 1898), to the recent case of Brigham v. 1lfoon Lake 
Electric Assoc., 24 U.2d 292, 470 P.2d 393 ( 1970), that 
in cases at law, an appeal from the District Court shall be 
only on questions of law. The footings for this funda-
mental legal axiom is the Judicial Article of the Consti-
tution,9 the proscription of which is: 
"***in cases at law the appeal shall be on ques-
tions of law alone." 
Even in a suit wherein this Court might conceivably 
disagree with or otherwise resolve the facts differently 
than the trial Judge, this Court has been circumspect in 
not substituting its factual judgment in lieu of that of 
the lower Court. Lyman, et al. vs. Town of Price, 222 
Pac. 599 (Utah 1924); In Re-Alexamder's Estate, 104 
l'.tah 286, 139 P .2d 432 ( 1943). Thus, this Court has 
l1eld that in cases at law, the scope of the judicial review 
as to matters of fact is one of determining whether there -9Articlc VIII Sec. 9. See also the limitations in 78-2-2 U.C.A., 1953. 
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is a reasonable basis in the record of trial upon whid 
the Findings of the lower Court may be premised. If so a 
the judicial review of the facts is at an end. Western Ga, e 
Appliances Inc. v. Serval, Inc., 123 Utah 229, 257 P.ir. c 
950 (1953). 
An action in eminent domain is fundamentally a cai1 
at law. Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 6 §26.731; 6i, 
5 
3-1 U.C.A. 1953. In particular, the issue of Just Com 
pensation is of legal character with the right of juf'. 
trial preserved. Rule 38, U.R.C.P., 78-34-10 U.C.A 
1953 as amended. Contrary to this plethora of blackletter ( 
law, Road Commission's counsel bottoms this appeal on l 
issues of factual essence. Firstly, it is contended that thb ' 
Court factually declare that the trial Judge could not 1 
in fact, eliminate severance damages to the "nonownea ' 
land from his Findings and Judgment and reversal i1/ l 
sought on that score. S~condly, it is contended. that thi:I' ; 
Court factually determme that the value testimony o; 
the State was the only credible, competent evidence at[ 
trial and that this case, therefore, be remanded anothe:\ 1 
time with instructions to enter Judgment squarely on tl1tl t 
Road Commission's testimony of Mr. Austin. Each a~·1 1 
ser~ion requires of this Court a .de novo analysis an~ ; 
weighing of the facts. Each P~mt suggest~ that Ull!l 1 
Court should determine whether it concurs with the far· 
tual determinations made by the trial Judge. But bot~ 1 
Points are defective and lack standing in this Court whe~ 
measured by the light of controlling constitutional, statu· 1 
tory, and decisional precedent. 
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id It is respectfully submitted that this Court decline, 
so as in the past, a factual review and determination of the 
ia, evidence in this case. The trial Court herein, on remand, 
.ii. operated strictly within the disciplines of this Court's 
mandate and made Amended Findings and entered 
Judgment accordingly. Those Findings and Judgment 
aii should remain undisturbed. 
6i, 
!Ill 
lll'· 
. A POINT IV . 
:ter CONTRARY TO THE STATE'S CLAIM, THE 
on RECORD OF TRIAL CONTAINS SUBSTAN-
:hb TIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE UPON 
iol WHICH THE TRIAL COURT COULD DE-
ea TERMINE AND ELIMINATE FROM ITS 
l 
111
1 FINDINGS SEVERANCE DAMAGES TO THE 
th~;I NONO\i\TNED LAND. 
: at[ The Statement of Facts herein outlines in some de-
heq tail the evidence of trial which is supportive of and would 
tl1ti enable District Judge Swan to calculate and determine 
a~·I the severance damage to the "nonowned" land and to 1n~I eliminate that damage from the Findings and J ud~ment. 
U1i1 See Statement of Facts, pages 13 through 16. Without 
'ar·I recounting that evidence fact by fact here, it is sufficient 
ot~ to say that there is a wealth of admittedly competent 
ne~ testimony upon which the trial Court could arrive at a 
tu· ineasurement of the amount of severance damage which 
it had, in the inital Findings and Judgment, attributed 
I to the "nonowned" land. 
I 
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I 
I 
I 
The economic summation sheets (Exhibits 24, ~: 
31 and 38) of all the witnesses illustrate that each valu 
expert made opinion judgments separating the bar 
"nonowned" land from the front acreage owned by U! 
Defendants. The specification of land categories esM 
lished by the witnesses for the Landowners and the valm 
ascribed to that land which, of necessity, delineated tn 
nonowned and the owned property, is so marked am 
pronounced throughout the transcript and evidence tha: 
no one of reasonable mind could be misled or miscon 
ceive the testimonal and exhibit evidence. The fact t!Ja: 
Mr. Kiepe found 1.8 acres of prime commercial pro~ 
erty, that Mr. Palmer found 2+ acres of higher commer· 
cial value and that Mr .. Mooney found 2 acres in tha' 
category, with the balance of the land (all of which wa: 
"nonowned") having a substantially lower use and mar 
ket value, does not require that the finder of fact be tiei 
in lock step to those precise value opinions. The fact tha1 
Mr. Austin for the State found that precisely 1.33 acre~! 
of land had a high commercial value, with the balanceol; 
the property, "nonowned,'' of a lesser value did not re·
1 
quire the Court to accept in bushel basket form, each elei 
ment of that appraisal. : 
I 
It is most significant, however, to note that tl1r! 
Austin appraisal, itself, forms a part of the basi~! 
upon which the trial Court could predicate findin~j 
in the case, for this particular witness did :lassify w:
1
, 
higher commercial value at 1.33 acres. '¥h1le the tn~, 
Court need not have, it could have taken the 1.33 acre! 
as the defined property under the Austin testimony, anr ! 
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applied to that acreage value estimates as found by the 
preponderance of the testimony from that of Messrs. 
Kiepe, Palmer and/or Mooney. Even Odds Inc. v. Niel-
son, supra; Weber Bw;in Conservency District v. Nelson, 
supra; authorities in Point I. It is to be emphasized that 
the trial Court could have made such finding, but it need 
not have done so to sustain the findings under the record 
of trial in this case. But the Austin testimony has addi-
tional significance as part of the larger record, for he 
testified that the "nonowned" land made no difference, 
whatsoever, to his findings of compensation and dam-
age; included or excluded from the trial, the nonowned 
land mattered not to his damage appraisal. (See Memor. 
Dec. of January 25, 1971, p. 2, Tr. 693). 
It was and is the trial judge's prerogative, and his 
alone, to determine from the weight of the evidence that 
less than 1.8 acres had a highest and best use for commer-
cial purposes, to predicate market value thereon, and to 
determine, as a result of the partial-taking by the Road 
Commission of the condemned land, the severance dam-
age to the remaining owned land. In corollary fashion, 
it was the trial Court's prerogative to review the evidence, 
and its probative value, find the preponderance and fac-
tually calculate, if determined possible, the severance 
damage which was allocated to the "nonowned" land in 
the original Findings and Judgment. The efforts of Ap-
pel!ant' s counsel in this appeal to require that the trial 
Court's fact finding process be structured and stereo-
typed so as to conform on the mark with the exactitudes 
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of the opinion evidence, is in vain. 10 Judge Swan labore 1 
under no such aberration in this lawsuit, and counsel t 
attempt to bring about a contrary holding should be n c 
jected. 
t 
The central question is whether the evidence sul r 
mitted as to the market value of the land, improvemem 8 
and fixtures situated thereon, both Before and Aftt i 
condemnation forms a reasonable bases upon which tl i 
trial Judge could make findings with respect to lli 
damages originally allotted to the "nonowned" lan1 
After careful scrutiny of evidence and record Judi 
Swan found, in fact, such determination could be, an. 
should be made pursuant to this Court's mandate an c 
such severance damage of $5,800.00 together with [ r 
terest, was thereupon eliminated in the Amended Fini 
0 
. d d 11 mgs an Ju gment. 
I ~ 
The opinion testimony and exhibits of the Lan( -
owners was proffered and received without objection\ ce 
State counsel regarding its competency, relevancy a :: 
general admissibility. No objection of that nature ;'. 
whatsoever form was raised by the State in the fiJ. 
~I 
appeal. And more importantly, no argument or contei ~ 
tion on that score was ever advanced by the State beforl ~ 
Judge Swan by motion, in prehearing conferences, hear 10 
ings or argument upon remand of the case in the f~ ~ 
II' 
" 
lOThe law abhors a mechanical fact determination. In reality, State Colll' ili 
says by his Brief, that the trier of fact must find, on damage questions four·W: : 
directly on the testimony of the witness-that findings cannot be made bd:: 
the range of the evidence. Such esotenc pos1t1on has been repudiated :, 
State Road CommiJJion v. Williams, 22 U.2d 301, 452 P.2d 548 (1969). 
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)f! appeal. 11 And so the answer to the question must be that 
1sel there was adequate, competent, admissible evidence ad-
~ n duced upon which the trial Judge could and did find the 
amount of severance damage which he initially attributed 
to the "nonowned" land. It follows a fortiori that having 
sill made that factual determination, the elimination of such 
em severance damages from the Findings and Judgment 
J!t is to be sustained, pursuant to the mandate of this Court 
1 tl in the first appeal. 
lli 
an1 I. The cases cited by State counsel are irrelevant. 
1di 
Appellant refers this Court to several federal de-
an. 
cisions and two State holdings in an effort to support the 
an 
. position that there is no competent evidence in the record 
I[ 
. · of trial to sustain the Findings of the District Judge. 
lTil 
'The decisions cited are unremarkable 12 and we have no 
1 ~uarrel with the proposition of the law expressed there-
Ill( __ _ 
1 UThe absence of such objection being raised on the first appeal and most 
II' certainly the failure to rnterpose the same before the tnal Judge upon rem1ttltur, 
D 
precludes the raising of any such issue (even assuming arguendo that any such 
a ob1ection was well taken, which it is not), for the first time before this Court. 
e Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Keller Corporation, 15 U.2d 318, 392 P.2d 620 
(1964); Huber v. Newman, 106 Utah 363, 145 P.2d 780 (1944). 
fii' . As a matter of fact, Appellant's counsel not only failed to raise thi.s objec-
~on before Judge Swan but he has chanf!.ed his theory from the quest10n pre-
lew iented to the trial Court and the issue that he attempts to press here. Before 
f 
I 
Judge Swan on remand, it was State counsel's lament that the lower Court must 
. Of ~ant a new trial because cross-examination of Landowners' expert had not been 
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1onducted relative to the "nonowned" land in the trial. The response to that 
e rontention was that the absence of such cross-examination was a matter of elec-
fo lion of State counsel and that he had opted voluntarily not to conduct such cross-
rxamination. No such cross-examination was ever attempted and no ruling ever 
111ued which would have foreclosed the same. State counsel has not raised the 
"'JJ·exami11ation question in this appeal at all. Appellant cannot now switch 
illl' fut theory of his case on appeal from that presented to the Court below. Davies 
:i~ :Mulholland, 25 U.2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970). 
cl1· . 1 ~Most of the decisions were pulled from Briefs filed in a recently tried 
:deral condemnation suit in Salt Lake City. 
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in. But it is a plain and simple fact that such decisio11 
have not a whit to do with this case, or with the l 1'inding: 
and Judgment of the trial Court. The opinion evidem, 
before Judge Swan that enabled him to determine tn1 
amount of severance damages to the "nonowned" Ian~ 
was not speculative, was not conjectural and was no 
based upon hypotheses. It was, to the contrary full1 
competent and admitted evidence which permitted tli; 
trial Court, in its discretion as the trier of fact, to deter 
mine the nonowned severance damage and to excise am 
strike that damage from the Amended Findings ani: 
Judgment. 
POINT V. 
CONTRARY TO THE CLAIM OF STATI 
COUNSEL, THE LANDO\VNERS FULLY 
SUSTAINED THEIR BURDEN OF PROO! 
ON COMPENSATION AND DAMAGESD 
THE CASE. 
Under Point II of Appellant's Brief, it is conteno 
ed that the Landowners failed to meet their burden oi 
proof on the issues of fair market value of the land taken, 
and damages to the remainder. Cases are cited on tn~ 
subject of the Landowners' burden.13 
It would only be to dignify an otherwise frjyo]oil': 
point to discuss this question in any depth under the rec, 
· h b. I A II nt fail< 13The most recrnt cases of this Court on t e su 1ect, t 1e ppe a ( WI 
note State Road Comm. '" Papuniko/a.r, 19 U.2d 153, 427 P.2d 749 
1 
' 
Stat~ Road Comm."· Tuggarl, 19 U.2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967). j 
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J11 ord made in this case. It is utter nonsense to allege that 
1g, under the testimony of the Landowners with respect to 
it'. the value of the owned land, Before and After condem-
111: nation, the market value of the property condemned and 
nr the damages to the remaining owned land, the Land-
10. owners fell short of the required burden of proof. 
ll1 The trial Court found, as a matter of fact and law, that 
l1t the burden of proof and persuasion had been satisfied 
~r and that indeed, the preponderance of the testimony 
m weighed in favor of the Landowners' testimony as to the 
nr: owned property. 
The burden of proof claim in Appellant's Brief is a 
make-weight argument and is unworthy of consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
This Appeal is cleanly controlled by the ruling law 
of this Court as announced in Prudential Federal Sav-
ings q; Loan Assoc. v. St. Paul Insurance Co., 22 U.2d 
70, 448 P .2d 724 ( 1968), a case arising out of a remand 
and accompanying mandate from an earlier appeal. In 
affirming the Judgment of the trial Judge, Henriod, J., 
writing for the Court stated: 
"This appeal is not from a new case, but in-
volves an alleged interpretation of what precisely 
we decided in our previous decision, which seems 
1·; to revolve about the reversal and remanding of 
the case with the interdiction 'consonant with this 
opinion.' * * * 
"TV e believe that the present so-called appeal 
is abortive and is more in the nature of a belated 
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petition for rehearing, after a previous app1181 
and petition for rehearing in both of which eve~'~ 
the problems involved here were canvassed a ' 
resolved. * * *." ,B 
ii1 
The questions raised by Appellant's counsel in ~ol 
case at bar have distinct, parallel import. District Ju~w 
Swan, herein, fully carried out the mandate of July~ tl 
1970, of this Court, factually determined and resolv1
1 
the severance damage previously awarded as to !a 
" d" 1 d b $ d h icl nonowne an to ~ ~,800.00 an struck t at dama~u, 
from the Amended Fmdmgs and Judgment. State coui f 
sel' s claim that such determination was factually impfr ! 
sible of accomplishment by the trial Judge is not, in lai P' 
a quarrel with the trial Court's ruling on remand, bu!
1 
a quarrel with the mandate of this Court of a year ag, 
If the State was displeased now it was equally so thej 
and the proper remedy was via a petition for rehear· i 
directed to the mandate. This appeal is as deficient an 
"abortive" as was that in the Prudential decision. 
The mandate of this Court in its Opinion of Jill: 
1970, established the "rule of the case" and under tile 
doctrine, all subsequent proceedings were governt 
thereby. Petty v. Clark, 113 Utah 205, 192 P.2d si 
( 1948) . The narrow issue of severance damages to tl 
"nonowned" land was resolved in the first appeal in If 
State's favor. On remand and under the mandate, In 
trial Court was able to calculate from the evidence ri 
ceived and the notes kept at trial, the nonowned serer 
ance damage and such was excised from the Amenor 
Findings and Judgment of Just Compensation. In co: 
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111sequence, the original Judgment was diminished by 
~~5,800.00 together with better than $1,500.00 interest. 
1~,But rather than this result, Appellant, by this appeal, 
iieeks a second crack at a full blown trial de novo on all 
~other aspects of value and damage in the case, aspects 
~which were never raised, discussed, or touched upon in 
~ilie first appeal. 
;~ The points raised in this A ppe~l are of eph:meral 
1character. The law of the case reqmres that the m-fact 
1~~uetermination made by the D:strict Court in satisfying 
fr !he mandate be affirmed in this Appeal and that Ap-
fr pellant' s position be rejected. 
~ i 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
STEWART M. HANSON, JR. 
400 El Paso Gas Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents 
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